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WEST VIRGINIA

LAW QUARTERLY
And THE BAR
VOLUME XXXI

APRIL, 1925

NumBEa 3

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.*
JAmES M. BECK"

I am greatly honored by the invitation of this ASsociation to
deliver this annual address. I fear I may disappoint your expectations. Possibly you may feel, when I have finished, like the
small boy who, after valorously struggling with the alphabet, remarked very solemnly to his mother that he doubted whether it
was worth while to go through so much to learn so little.
My subject is the Supreme Court of the United States.
To an audience of lawyers that is a threadbare theme. To deserve your interest I must leave the beaten path of such discussions, and interest you with something more than the conventional
eulogy of the court or the usual description of its functions.
Its peculiar function in our jurisprudence has never been better
described than by a young Frenchman, who came to this country
nearly a century ago and wrote an acute and subtle commentary
upon our institutions.
In 1831 De Tocqueville published his "Democracy in America,"
a work nothing undervalued to the classic Federalist papers. Of
the Supreme Court he says:
"The peace, the prosperity and the very existence of the
Union are vested in the hands of seven Judges. Without their
active co-operation the Constitution would be a dead letter.
* Address before the West Virginia State Bar Association, Clarksburg, W. Va.,
November 21. 1924.
* Solicitor General of the United States.
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The Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers, the Legislature demands
their protection from the designs of the Executive; they defend
the Union from the disobedience of the States, the States from
the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against
the interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of
order against the fleeting innovations of democracy. Their
power is enormous, but it is clothed in the authority of public
opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians of a people which
respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect
or popular contempt."
Anything that unfairly saps public confidence in that court
not merely wars against the court and threatens its existence, but,
as a matter of fact, challenges the Constitution itself.
It is a curious fact that the court has been almost continuously
the subject of attack by different classes of our citizens, varying
at different times, for a period of 121 years.
There is this important distinction between the attacks upon the
judicial branch of the Government and those upon the executive
and legislative branches-for none of the great trinity of power
has ever in a democracy escaped a fair measure, and sometime an
unfair measure, of criticism-that, with respect to the executive
and legislative departments, the attack has never been, except
on the very rarest occasions, upon those departments as institutions, but generally only upon the individuals who for the time
filled the offices of those departments.
In other words, the American people have rarely attacked the
presidency as an institution. They have attacked every man who
temporarily was the incumbent of that great office, not excepting
Washington himself, but the attack was always upon the temporary incumbent, and not upon the institution. The same is true
with respect to Congress, that the attack has generally been upon
the individuals who from time to time form Congress, and who,
in each generation, are held up as Exhibit 1 of the degeneracy of
the Republic. But the attack has rarely been against Congress
as an institution.
With the Supreme Court the attack was never, with possibly a
few exceptions, upon the incumbents of the office, but always upon
the institution. The long roll of distinguished jurists, who have
formed from time to time the Supreme Court of the United States,
has never been challenged on the ground either of their integrity
or ability.
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Justice Chase was impeached for political indiscretions very
early in the Nineteenth Century, and was acquitted.
And yet the Court, as an institution, has been the subject of
continuous attack for more than a century.
The causes are two-fold:
For one of those causes the Supreme Court is not responsible,
and for the other it is responsible.
With respect to the first cause of criticism, the attacks simply
evidence the revolt of democracy against any curb upon its powers.
In other words, it represents a revolt not against the Supreme
Court, but against the wise restraints of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution, again and again, by affirmation and negation,
draws the solemn circle of law around the inalienable rights of
the individual, which it refuses to subject to the caprice of the
majority of the fleeting day.
It is the genius of our institutions that our government is a democracy in leash, or subject to a curb. Nor in that is there any
reflection upon our form of democracy, because Edmund Burke
well said that the restraints of a people are to be counted among
their rights, especially where they are, as in this ease, self-imposed
restraints.
But with the rising tide of democracy it is very natural that
there should be an increased hostility, or, shall I say, an increased
dislike, of the curb which the Constitution has put upon the fleeting majorities of a given day. When this social aspiration is
checked or that fad meets defeat in the Supreme Court, it is human
nature that those, to whom it is a matter of great concern, are critical of a power that has thwarted their will.
But there is a second reason for a hostile attitude on the part
of many in each generation, for which in its incipiency the Supreme Court is in part responsible. The attack upon the Court
began with an unwise and unjust act of the court itself, which we
lawyers applaud, and yet it is one of the few questionable episodes
in the history of a court that has lasted more than a century and
a quarter.
I refer to the case of Marbury v. Madison' always quoted and
cited as one of the glories of the court; and yet that decision
created, and justifiably, a resentment, which was the beginning
of the attacks upon the court.
Thomas Jefferson in 1880 had been elected President of the
United States. He was the undoubted choice of the people. The
II

Cranch 137, 2 I. 'Ed. 60 (3803).
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Federalist Party, humiliated by the defeat, but holding office until
the 4th of March, and being until that time in control of both
branches of Congress, determined to make the judiciary the last
rampart of their political power, and accordingly they created a
number of Federal Judges, of which at the time there was no
apparent necessity, and proceeded to fill them before John Adams
ceased to be President. The Secretary of State was John Marshall.
The commissions were in most cases made out, and, as was the
custom of that day, countersigned by him as Secretary of State,
and in many cases delivered to the appointees. The appointments
were made in many instances on the last night of the Adams Administration and within a few hours of the dawn of the Jefferson Administration.
John Adams had left Washington. He would not remain to
show the chosen Chief Magistrate of the American Union the
respect of his presence, a precedent that never has been followed
by any of his successors. It is worthy of remembrance that Woodrow Wilson, sick in body, and of course deeply dejected in spirit,
did go to the inauguration of his successor at a very great sacrifice to his physical strength, and all honor to him for having so
done. He followed the precedents of every President with the
exception of John Adams, who deliberately left the White House,
leaving John Marshall in charge.
It is undoubtedly a fact that John Marshall up until nine o'clock
of the 3rd of March was filling the newly-created judicial positions.
According to a tradition of the Jefferson family, which may or
may not be accurate, Marshall was still signing the commissions
of the midnight judges until 12 o'clock, when Levi Lincoln, the
prospective Attorney General of Mr. Jefferson, appeared in the
room and took possession of the papers.
Among the commissions that had been signed, but remained
undelivered on March 4th, was the commission of Mr. Marbury
as a justice of the peace. Mr. Jefferson did what today would be
regarded as his undoubted right, he delivered some of those commissions to the appointees and refused to deliver others, including
that of Mr. Mvarbury. Thereupon Mr. Marbury brought in the
Supreme Court of the United States an action for a mandamus to
compel Madison, the new Secretary of State, to deliver his commission. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the case, put
the Attorney General of the United States on the stand and threatened to examine James Madison, the new Secretary of State.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol31/iss3/2

4

Beck: The Supreme Court of the United States
THE UPREE COURT

Finally, in 1803, the famous decision in Marbury v. Madison was
handed down.
In what I shall say, please understand-and I emphasize this
to prevent any misunderstanding-that there can be no one here
who admires John Marshall more than I do. He was not only the
greatest judge that America ever produced, but having in mind
the surpassing importance of his legal decisions I am inclined to
think that he was the greatest judge that the world has yet known,
because none ever passed with such extraordinary ability and unstained integrity upon such a vast amount of complicated governmental law as did the greatest of all our Chief Justices. Nevertheless, John Marshall ought never to have sat in Marbury v.
Madison. A commission that he had signed as Secretary of State
was the subject matter of the litigation. His own political act
was under consideration. Moreover, he had been a potent political
force in the John Adams Administration. When President Adams
was absent, Marshall was the acting President of the United States.
He was in sympathy with this attempt to create eleventh hour
judges and to appoint them by midnight commissions, and the
propriety of Jefferson's refusing to deliver some of those commissions to the appointees was a matter, in which, as a political
controversy, he had been not only a participant but actually the
most active protagonist. It illustrates the shifting standards of
judicial propriety that apparently the impropriety of the Chief
Justice sitting in this case excited at the time little, if any, comment, while today a Chief Justice, who thus acted, would subject
himself to the hazard of an impeachment.
Nevertheless, he delivered the opinion of the Court, and of course
I am saying what is very familiar to the lawyers here, but possibly
not so familiar to laymen in my audience. He said he would discuss the three questions in the order in which counsel had discussed them, namely, whether Marbury had title to his office; second,
whether a mandamus could issue to a Secretary of State to complete his title by giving him his commission, and, thirdly, whether
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in an original action for a
mandamus.
Beveridge, in his classical life of M arshall, says that the Chief
Justice was in error when he said that that was the order in
which counsel had discussed the case. The fact remains that thereupon Chief Justice Marshall held, first, that Marbury had a title
to the office; secondly, that mandamus would lie to compel the
Secretary of State to deliver the commission; and, thirdly, that
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the judiciary act in purporting to give original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court was unconstitutional, and therefore the court was
without any jurisdiction to decide any question in that litigated
case.
In other words, he first decides two political and highly controversial questions, in which he had been a protagonist against
Thomas Jefferson, and thereupon, having decided these two questions and given all the moral effect of the great court's decision
to the title of Marbury, he proceeds to say the court has no jurisdiction to make such determination.
This abuse of judicial power was probably inspired by pure motives. Marshall was very apprehensive as to the fate of the Republic when Mr. Jefferson became President, as the head of a triumphant democracy; but whatever the motives, it was not judicial. Mr.
Beveridge, in his admirable but very laudatory biography, says
it was the act of a statesman. I cannot so regard it for two reasons,
which I shall discuss presently. But it certainly was not the act of
a jurist, and a parallel to it could not be cited in the history of the
Supreme Court.
From the moment that affront was given to the Executive, Thomas Jefferson unleashed the dogs of war against the Supreme Court.
Up to that time the Supreme Court had been free from attack. Up
to that time its power to declare a law invalid for being contrary
to the Constitution had never been seriously questioned. It was
too well known to the Framers of the Constitution, who were then
alive, that the Articles of the Constitution did intend, not by implication, but expressly to confer upon the Supreme Court the
right to preserve the Constitution by invalidating any law either
of Congress or of a State that was inconsistent therewith. Therefore, the decision in Marbury v. Madison, to the extent that it
sustained the power of the Supreme Court to invalidate a statute,
was at that time unnecessary, for it had not been seriously disputed. But it became thereafter vitally necessary, because the decision
in Marbury v. Madison created a popular distrust of the Federal
judiciary, and Mr. Jefferson, unhappily not contenting himself
with his just criticism of a court, which had decided a question
when it admitted it had no jurisdiction, carried his attack further,
and held that the Supreme Court could not invalidate any law of
Congress. When that idea gained force, the opinion in Marbury
v. Maditson became of inestimable importance, not by reason of
anything before, but by reason of what followed, because the
great decision in Marbury v. Madison became the great rampart
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of the judicial power of the Constitution, and still remains the
classic vindication of this function of the Supreme Court.
Until his dying day Jefferson never forgave that affront, and
as long as human nature is human nature can any one blame him,
who will calmly consider the facts, without an excessive and idolatrous admiration of Marshall? As long as he was President he
forbade every district attorney to cite Marbury v. Madison, not because Marbury v. Madison decided that the court had power to
invalidate a statute, but because he said it was a case that was not
a litigated ease in any proper sense of the term, and was a usurpation of power.
This attack upon the court had hardly died down after Jefferson's death, when a later mstake was made by the court, which
again gave vitality to the attack upon it.
Slavery was the great question that divided our country in the
first part of the nineteenth century. It was more than a question
of economic interest. It involved the control of the government.
It was early recognized that if slaves could be introduced into
every territory of the United States that the south would dominate
the country. Therefore, in 1820, a statute was passed, known in
history as the Missouri Compromise, which provided a dead line,
to the south of Nrhich slaves could be imported; to the north of
which slavery was prohibited.
If ever there was a political settlement that ought to have had
sanctity, so far as the Supreme Court was concerned, it was the
Missouri Compromise, because both of the great historic parties
of the country in accepting it made valuable concessions to preserve the Union. And yet in 1857, in Taney's time, when the
Supreme Court was no longer composed of Justices who had been
Federalists, as in Marshall's day, but was now composed of Justices who had been democrats, great pressure was brought to bear
upon the court, as the south felt its control of the Government
slipping away, to declare this Act of 1820 null and void on the
ground that the Constitution had not conferred any legislative
power to prohibit slavery in any Territory of the American Union.
The Supreme Court yielded to the temptation, the famous Dred
Scott 2 decision was announced, and you know the terrible consequences.
Possibly nothing did so much to cause the most lamentable and
fratricidal war in all history as the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Dred Scott ease. The Republican party took up the quarrel
2 19 Howard 393, 15 I. Ed. 691 (1857).
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of Mr. Jefferson with the court, and for many years afterwards
the power of the court to declare any law unconstitutional was the
subject of bitter attack.
Let me now ask your attention to the question as to whether
the function of the Supreme Court is in fact exclusively judicial.
A doubt on this question may be a shock to a great many lawyers,
for it is almost axiomatic that the court has no duty that is not
strictly judicial But is this* so?
In the nomenclature of the law its duties are simply judicial,
because what we mean by the judicial powers of the Supreme
Court are the powers which it has exercised from the beginning
as a court of justice. But in a more general and essential sense,
has not the Supreme Court quasi-legislative powers of the very
greatest importance, and may not these quasi-legislative powers
have a very vital bearing upon the wisdom of three of the rules
which have animated the court from the beginning?
Montesquieu had a profound influence upon the framers of the
Constitution, and they attempted to carry out his ideal of a rigid
separation of the executive, legislative and judicial departments
of the Government. Our political philosophy has always accepted
his theory as axiomatic, and yet a very clearheaded man, who was
not a lawyer, recognized more than a century ago that such rigid
line of demarcation was impossible. He said:
"Notwithstanding our pride, our thousand and one pamphlets,
our endless speechifying, we are very ignorant of political and
social science. We have not yet defined what we mean by the
executive, legislative and judicial powers. Montesquieu'q definitions are false. In fifty years I can see but one thing that we
have defined clearly and that is the sovereignty of the people,
but we have done no more toward settling what is constitutional
than we have in the distribution of powers."
That was said by Napoleon Bonaparte on the eve of the XVIII
Brumaire, and it is extraordinary that a soldier, who was not a
lawyer, could have seen what so few lawyers ever did see and few
students of political science even now see, the impossibility in practical government of any rigid separation of these three powers.
It is largely a question of definitions. If you mean by judicial
power the power to determine finally and authoritatively what is
the law, then judicial power is the power solely of the courts. But
if judicial power means the exposition of the meaning of the
law, the determination of what is law, then the executive has a
primary judicial function. The President takes an oath to support
and maintain and defend the Constitution of the United States,
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and a primary judicial duty devolves upon him as Chief Magistrate
to determine whether each of his acts is within a power delegated
to him by the Constitution of the United States.
Andrew Jackson so recognized, and gave a striking illustration
of this duty. He believed that the power to create a national bank
was not an implied power under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court in McCufloch v. Maryland3 decided that it was. The bank
then came up for recharter, and Jackson vetoed it, and claimed that
it was his right, if he believed that that law was unconstitutional,
to say so, notwithstanding the Supreme Court had given another
opinion. While there has been much discussion as to how far
Jackson was within his rights as President in vetoing the second
charter of the bank on the ground that there was no constitutional
power to create it, yet his right to exercise the veto power for any
reason that appealed to his conscience is generally recognized.
Similarly, every proposed law, that comes up for passage in Congress, should impose upon that body a primary judicial duty to
determine whether it is within the competence of the Federal
Government. In the first 50 or 75 years of the Republic the debates in the Supreme Court on the Constitution were equalled,
although not surpassed, by the debates in the Senate and the
House of Representatives on the true construction of the Constitution. Each member of the House and Senate recognized a
sworn duty to determine, when he voted upon any bill, whether
it was within his power to pass it. Unfortunately, that spirit
of constitutional morality has largely vanished. Today, there
are few constitutional arguments in Congress. The members Will
rarely listen to them. Obsessed with Montesquieu's theory of a
rigid separation of the executive, the judicial and the legislative
functions, Congress abdicates its solemn duty to pass upon the
constitutionality of proposed legislation and shifts the responsibility to the Judiciary.
In my judgment, nothing threatens the perpetuity of our in.
stitutions so much as the decay of what I have called constitutional morality, for the obvious reason that a constitution cannot survive unless there is a people that is politically receptive of it.
The moment that the people of the United States are no longer
politically receptive of their institutions, the Constitution will
slowly perish. The best method of developing the sense of constitutional morality is to make our representatives in Congress
feel, and indeed the people themselves feel, that they have a
1 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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primary judicial duty to determine whether a given act or proposed law is or is not within the limits of the Constitution.
It was in that spirit that our Constitution was first formed and
later developed. That spirit is gone today, due to the Montesquieu theory that such questions are only the concern of the Judiciary. Thus, we place an impossible burden upon the Supreme
Court. It is asked again and again to deny the validity of some
Act of Congress, passed to meet the clamor of some particular
class, when as a matter of fact the primary judicial duty was with
the Congress and not with the Supreme Court.
What quasi-legislative powers have the Judiciary?
Under our system most statutes are enumerations rather than
definitions. That is to say, they suggest a general purpose, but
they do not attempt to fill in the details. Moreover, they cannot
possibly anticipate the contingencies of human life that may come
into existence after the passage of the law. What does a court
do, whether it be the Supreme Court or an inferior court? They
take a statute, which simply in very general terms states a legislative objective, and they build upon it a super-structure of decisions, laying down rules of law as to when that statute applies
and when it does not apply. At times the court is obliged to say
that it will or will not apply this law to a certain state of circumstances which were not and could not have been in the mind of the
legislature when the legislature passed the law, and when the
court must guess what would have been the intention of the
legislature, if they had forseen such contingencies.
I can give you a very striking illustration, if any illustration
is needed. Take the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, the first sentence
of which in very general language prohibits all combinations in
restraint of trade. The whole body of jurisprudence, that now
for 34 years has been built by the processes of inclusion and exclusion, has been built by the Judiciary upon that simple and
vague statement of Congress. In that elaborate system of inclusion and exclusion, can it be denied that in a sense and in a very
proper way a great deal of positive law has been superimposed
by the courts upon the text of a statute?
The provisions of our Constitution rarely define and almost always simply enumerate. The entire superstructure of the Constitution, which Alexander Hamilton, if he were to revisit the
"glimpse of the moon", would today not recognize, has been erected by the Federal judiciary, and principally by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
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Take the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Congress is in
a few words given the power to regulate commerce among the
several States. Upon that, in 265 volumes of reports, running
over 130 years, with a wisdom that passes admiration, with a
stretch of the understanding that has never been surpassed by the
courts of any country, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in adapting that clause to the economic needs of an industrially
centralized nation in the most progressive age in history, has
built up by inclusion and exclusion an elaborate and complex
system for the regulation of commerce.
That makes the Supreme Court in a very qualified sense a
quasi-constitutional convention. That thought is often impressed
upon my mind when I argue a constitutional case, and especially
where, as in rare instances, I am arguing one in which there has
been no former exposition of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court is thus in a qualified sense a continuing Constitutional convention, with this difference, that it can originate nothing; but
in a very real sense by its process of interpretation it does build
a superstructure, the most amazing, the most magnificent governmental structure in the world, slowly erected upon that simple
foundation of four thousand words adopted by the framers of the
Constitution 137 years ago.
Having in mind these quasi-legislative powers of the court in
developing our constitutional institutions and in amplifying statutory enactments, let me now discuss the three principles that have
guided that court and see in the light of what I have just said
whether all of them can be said to be free from possible question
as to whether they are absolute truths rather than general truths.
The first guiding principle is that the court will never act in an
advisory capacity. Very early in the history of our country
President Washington was very much disturbed by a question of
treaty obligation. We had made a treaty with France in which
we solemnly promised that if France were attacked the United
States would come to her relief. But that treaty was made with
King Louis XVI, and the Jacobin terror was now in existence.
France, engaged in war with England and Holland, called upon
the infant republic of the United States to redeem its treaty pledge.
Washington asked the Supreme Court to give him an opinion as
to the continuing obligation of the treaty. Apparently, Chief Justice Jay refused to do so, holding that the power of the Supreme
Court was only the power to decide litigated cases.
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Then a little later, when the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions
were passed, which threatened a possible nullification of Federal
laws, Alexander Hamilton appealed to the Supreme Court to join
with the executive and the legislative departments in protesting
against the purport of these resolutions. Again the Supreme
Court said that they were unable to give any advisory opinion.
Later James Monroe sent a message to Congress, in which he
denied that Congress had any power to appropriate money for
purely internal improvements, and as that was challenged and was
the subject of very great debate, Monroe, imitating John Adams
and George Washington, appealed to the Supreme Court (Marshall
then being the Chief Justice) and asked the court to give the
executive its guidance with respect to the constitutionality of Federal appropriations for internal improvements.
Chief Justice
Marshall expressed his opinion, and his colleague, Mr. Justice
Johnson, after conferring with all the members of the court, wrote
to Monroe that he was authorized by his associates on the Bench
to say that, so far as internal improvements were for the purpose
of building military or postal roads, internal improvements were
permissible. Thus, for the first and only time in all history the
Supreme Court acted in an advisory way.
To the general rule which declines to give advisory opinions, I
do not dissent. Its wisdom has been amply vindicated through
the long history of the court. In fact, on the only occasion in
our time when the court departed to a certain extent from that
rule the result was rather disastrous. I refer to the electoral
commission of 1876, when the Supreme Court loaned five of its
Justices to an extra-constitutional commission. The result did
not help the prestige of the court.
But while it is a good general rule, is it quite clear that it is
an absolute truth that the Supreme Court ought never, under
any circumstances, give an advisory opinion, when it can co-operate with the other branches of the Government? It is under no
obligation to do so, and any advisory opinion would not have
any judicial force in the sense of adjudicating any one's rights.
Nevertheless, there might be extraordinary instances, where the
court, which is not forbidden by the Constitution from giving an
advisory opinion, might with justice give such an opinion and with
very great usefulness.
A law is passed, acquiesced in, men's rights built upon it, on
the presumption of its validity, and then years afterwards, in
private litigation between John Doe and Richard Roe, the Supreme
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Court suddenly says that the statute is invalid, and then it is
generally impossible to restore the parties to the status quo, or to
undo the harm of the enforcement of the law.
Take, for example, the commodities law, which was designed to
compel every railroad that owned coal mines to sell them. Its
constitutionality was attacked. Suppose that a number of railroads had, at the sacrifice of many millions of dollars, sold their
mines on the presumption of the validity of that Act, and ten or
twenty years later it had developed that the Act was unconstitutional, the loss would have been irreparable. So great was the
hardship of that law that the Attorney General suspended its enforcement pending a decision as to its validity, although he had
no legal power to do so.
If Congress, by a Joint Resolution, signed by the President,
asked the Supreme Court to give an advisory opinion as to whether
such a law was within the competence of Congress, is it so clear
that the Court should decline its aid? It may be that if a bare
majority of Congress, composed of the members of one party, could
drag the Supreme Court into any current political controversy,
its prestige would be endangered. But if the men of both parties,
sincerely dubious as to whether they were empowered to pass a law,
could, by resolution passed by a largely preponderating majority
of Congress-say, three-fourths--ask such advice of the Supreme
Court, I am not so clear as many others that the giving of an
advisory opinion under great and exceptional circumstances would
be unwise.
This idea is not as novel as our long acquiescence in Montesquieu's doctrine might lead us to believe. It is an established part
of the governmental system of England, from which we have drawn
so largely the inspiration of our institutions. Indeed, the very
form of the judgments of the House of Lords and of the Privy
Council is that their Lordships "humbly advise his Majesty," etc.
It is, however, generally supposed that Montesquieu so far changed the American theory of government that an advisory function
of the judiciary is un-American, but the oldest American State
(with the exception of Virginia), namely Massachusetts, not only
had this feature of government from the beginning, but
has preserved it to this day; and my information is that it has
worked well. Certainly, the prestige of the highest court of Massachusetts, which ranks second to none of the State judiciaries, has
not been impaired by this advisory function. Following the ex-
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ample of England, where the King and the Lords can always request the opinion of the judges of England, the Massachusetts constitution has always provided, and still provides, that the Governor
and the legislature can require an advisory opinion from the
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court.
The highest court of Massachusetts has rendered many such advisory opinions, called in the Reports "The opinions of the
Judges," and they have developed very wisely and conservatively
the advisory system. They decline to give an opinion except upon
important questions of law. They will not give any opinion as to
questions of fact, and will only give an opinion when the legal
question is actually before the legislature and when the giving of
the opinion is necessary in order to enable the legislature to determine the extent of its powers. The court has further held that
in giving such an opinion they act not as a court but merely as advisers, and that they are not bound by any such advisory opinion,
if the question should arise later in the court in the course of actual litigation. I am informed that Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island. Florida, Colorado, and South Dakota have somewhat similar provisions.
In the Federal Convention of 1787, there was a very different
provision for a revisory over legislation. The plan, which strangely
enough, was advocated by Madison and Wilson provided that the
President and the Supreme Court revise all legislation before it
was finally enacted, and this was apparently an imitation of the
French system, whereby no law was ever valid until "registered"
by the judiciary.
The Constitutional Convention very wisely voted this down on
three occasions, for nothing could be more harmful than to permit
the judiciary to pass upon the expediency of legislation.
The duty of giving an advisory opinion on the grave legal question of power, when the public interests require a speedy determination, is a very different proposition, and I am inclined to
think that our theory of a division of government into the executive, legislative and judicial would work better and more harmoniously, if our Supreme Court, upon proper occasion rendered the
same great service as the highest court of Massachusetts.
Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids. The existing
theory, which forbids advisory opinions, is only the result of custom and precedent, and is undoubtedly due to the extreme state-
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ment of Montesquieu. Let me give a very striking illustration of
the hardship of our system, of which I have some knowledge.
After the Spanish-American War, the question arose as to
whether all of the limitations of the Constitution applied to the
colonial dependencies which we had acquired as the result of that
war, but which we had not incorporated into the Union. It was
obvious that it would be very difficult to govern the Philippines
and Porto Rico if the provision as to uniformity of taxation applied
to such dependencies. This question could have been determined
before any legislation was passed if the President and Congress
could have asked the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion upon
a plain question of constitutional power. The question was a new
one and of extraordinary difficulty. Congress took a leap into the
dark and passed the law. It imposed a different tax upon Porto
Rican imports than upon other imports of the United States.
Merchandise amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars was
exported and imported on the basis of this law, but its validity
was only determined years later in a litigated case, which involved
the importation of some lemons, and, as you will recall, the
Supreme Court divided in the most extraordinary way in all its
history. Here, at least, no hardship was done, because the validity
of the law was sustained; but a famous instance of great hardship
was the Missouri Compromise Law of 1820. If the Supreme Court
had then in an advisory opinion advised the Congress that such a
law was beyond its competence, some other and more lawful compromise would have been made. As it was, after the people of
the United States had acquiesced in the Compromise for 37 years,
the Supreme Court, in the case of a fugitive slave named Dred
Scott, destroyed the law.
Our blind acceptance of the Montesquien doctrine has, in turn,
blinded us to the possible disadvantages of this method of government. Nevertheless, it is now an integral part of our governmental system, and any change seems so remote that my discussion in
an interrogative form and as an abstraction may seem a needless
waste of time.
The second principle of the Supreme Court, which has guided
the Court from the very beginning, is that it would never declare
a law invalid except its invalidity was clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt. It has always seemed to me that the rule was too strongly stated-that the true rule ought to be that it would never declare any law unconstitutional unless it were clearly satisfied of
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its invalidity. If there was a balance of doubt, it should be resolved-as democracy requires--in favor of the law. To say that
it cannot discharge its exalted function as the "balance wheel"
of the Constitution without taking into account a remote doubt,
which exists in almost every case, would-if literally followed in
practice-virtually impair its own powers. While the doctrine is,
as I have stated it, as a matter of fact many of the decisions of the
court, which could be cited, are quite inconsistent with the doctrine. The court has frequently adjudged legislation invalid even
though the constitutional question-as, for example, the Income
Tax Cases4-- was so doubtful and difficult that the conclusion could
only be reached by a divided court after more than one argument.
It therefore cannot be literally true that no statute can be declared invalid if there be any doubt, however unreasonable; and
yet the court has repeatedly stated the rule in this extreme manner.
For example, it is said in Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson
City5 :
"An Act of Congress should not be declared unconstitutional
unless its repugnancy to the supreme law of the land is too clear
to admit of dispute."
And again, in the Sinking Fund Cases," it is said
"Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of
a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond
a rational doubt."
Can it be questioned that in the Income Tax Cases the validity
or invalidity of the statute did at least "admit of dispute," and
that its invalidity (as subsequently adjudged) was not beyond "a
rational doubt?" It seems to me the true rule is that stated in
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, that"the judicial power to declare legislative action invalid on constitutional ground is to be exercised only in clear cases."
It is needless to suggest that a conclusion may be clear and yet
be subject to dispute and its correctness not free from "rational
doubt."
This extreme statement of the doctrine in itself manifests the
conservatism-not to say timidity-with which the Court has discharged its duty of keeping both the Nation and the States within
their respective orbits of power.
It is estimated that Congress has passed from the beginning of
- 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759 (1819; 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 1108 (1895).

173 U. S. 592, 43 L. Ed. 823 (1898).
99 U. S. 700, 25 L. Ed. 496 (1879).
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the Government nearly 50,000 substantive laws, and of these approximately fifty have been adjudged unlawful.
Prior to the decision of Marbury v. Madison the court was
criticized because it did not declare more statutes invalid, but
since that time the criticism has always taken the form that the
court has abused its power in nullifying too many. In my judgment, if the court is subject to any criticism, it is that it has
been too timid in the exercise of this great power.
When Ben Johnson was told that Shakespeare's friends boasted
that his manuscripts did not show the erasure of a single line,
"Rare Ben" replied: "Would he had blotted a thousand," and
the thoughtful student of our institutions can without difficulty
find instances, in which the court, in sustaining unconstitutional
statutes, erred on the side of conservatism. I may only instance
two recent cases, one the Adamson Law,7 where wages of State
corporations were raised by Federal statute, and this indefensible
exertion of Federal power was excused on the ground of "emergency"--a very dangerous answer to constitutional doubts-and
the other, the newspaper censorship law,8 where Congress perverted its power over the mails to censor newspaper publications. Both
were sustained because the court, conscious of the rising criticism
against its chief power, preferred to sustain the statutes, on the
theory that a doubt existed. The only possible doubt was one that
was engendered by conservatism.
The spirit with which the court should in my judgment approach such problems was well expressed by the great Chief Justice in Maibury v. Madison, when he said that the objectors to this
power of the court were"reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close
their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that the act which according to the
principles and theory of our Government, is entirely void, is
yet in practice completely obligatory."
He added impressively:
"Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeable
to the Constitution of the United States, if that Constitution
forms no rule for his government; if it is closed upon him and
cannot be inspected by him; if such be the real state of things,
this is worse than solemn mockery."
Certainly, if the court is, as I have said, co-operatively to
7 Wilson v.

New, 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755 (1916).
v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 57 L, Ed. 1190 (1912).

8 Lewis Publishing Co.,
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work with the legislative and executive in labors of a quasi-legislative character, it cannot abdicate its duty because of the doctrine
of possible doubt, and the mischief of the doctrine, as it seems to
me, is that it leaves too easy a way to escape a duty. An unconstitutional statute is passed and it may be popular or unpopular.
If the former, and it be desired to declare it valid, it is easy to
find a reason to sustain it on the theory of a fanciful doubt; but
if unpopular, the court has no difficulty in showing its repugnancy
to the fundamental law, even if the question is not free from doubt.
This doctrine has had the unfortunate effect of giving seeming
justification to false theories of the judicial power. A former
member of the Court, Mr. Justice Clarke, for whom I have very
great respect, says that whenever two or three Justices dissent
that that in itself imports a doubt, and therefore the law ought
to be regarded as valid. Senator Borah would accomplish the
same result by requiring seven Judges to concur. Every Justice
individually takes an oath to defend the Constitution of the United
States. What is asked is not a composite opinion, but his individual judgment. If a clear majority of that court are of the opinion
that a statute is invalid, the mere fact that two or three of their
brethren of the Bench are of an opposite opinion ought not to
interfere with the deliberate judgment of a majority of the court,
and no one would ever consider that it should so interfere, were
it not for the thought that a divided court implies that the question is not so clear that this great power of invalidating statutes
should be exercised.
The third principle of the Court is this:
At the beginning of the court it was confronted with a question
of extraordinary difficulty, and it was one that they have not yet
wholly solved, although they are nearer solution now than they
have ever before been. That question was this: The powers of
the Federal Government were given for the purposes of the Federal Government; in some cases those purposes are indicated. In
other cases they are not indicated in the text of the Constitution,
but obviously every power granted to the Federal Government can,
theoretically at least, only be exercised for a strictly Federal purpose.
What then is to be done when Congress passes a law which
is within its delegated power, but with a purpose and an objective
that is not within the competence of the Federal Government?
That question arose very early in the history of the Court, and
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Chief Justice Marshall gave it an answer which, however, was
only obiter dictum. He said :'
"Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government;
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an
act was not the law of the land."
As you know, about 50 years later that doctrine was abandoned
and another substituted, which went far to impair the duality of
our form of government, and which, if persisted in, would undoubtedly have had that result. In the famous case of Veazie
Bank v. Fenno,0 the central government desired to stop the States
from issuing currency notes. That unquestionably was the objective. That the States had the right to authorize their banks
to issue currency notes was not disputed. The Congress, in the exercise of its excise power put a prohibitive tax upon any currency
notes issued by the States. The Supreme Court might have justified the Act under that clause of the Constitution which gives to
the Federal Government the power to provide for a uniform currency, but they went further and decided that it was impotent to
invalidate a law because of the supposed improper purposes of
those who passed it. And that law was followed to its literal rigor
in later eases, as for example, the famous oleomargarine case, McCray v. United States," where the dairy interests had lobbied
through Congress a prohibitive tax upon any oleomargarine that
was coloired in imitation of butter, with a very light tax upon oleomargarine if it were colored pink or red or some color that nobody
would ever take for butter in that form. There was no doubt that
it was not intended to raise revenue. It was obviously intended to
usurp a right reserved to the States as to whether they would
or would not permit the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine, but the court, in one of the most striking opinions of Chief
Justice White, rejected the idea that the Supreme Court could ever
sit in judgment upon the motives with which Congress exercise
an otherwise delegated power.
To the same effect was the Lottery Case, 2 which I three
times argued in the court; and while my contention finally pre'o
1

M,cCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 423, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
8 Wall 533, 19 U. Ed. 482 (1869).
195 U. S. 27, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1903).
188 U. S. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492 (1902).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1925

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1925], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

vailed, I confess that I question whether any decision in our
time ever did so much mischief. It opened the flood-gate to all
13
kinds of anti-constitutional legislation. In the Lottery Case,'
after three oral arguments, it was finally decided that the power
to regulate commerce was the power to prohibit commerce. Thereupon, in the great tendency toward centralization that prevailed
in that time, Congress, by utilizing the taxing power, the commerce power and the power over the mails and the currency
and national banks, believed that it could strip the States of many
reserved rights. There was almost no law under the theory of
Mcray v. United States14 and Veazie Bank v. Fenno" that Congress could not pass, no matter how obvious the abuse of the Federal power was, if the power thus perverted to unconstitutional
ends was in the first instance a delegated power.
As a result, there came a flood of wild legislation. It seemed
to many of us as if the end of our dual form of Government had
come. But the Supreme Court saw that that doctrine had been
carried too far and that the only remedy was to return to the
doctrine of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, for
when the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart0 arose where the commerce power was used to prevent child's labor, the court did
recognize a perversion of the plenary power over interstate com7
merce. Yet if McCray v. United States"
was properly decided,
the attempt to exercise a power over the employment of child labor
that was clearly and concededly reserved to the States, was made
possible by denying the channels of interstate commerce to the
employer. The Supreme Court, as you know, by a majority of
one, held that that law was not a regulation of commerce, although
the court did not, in terms invalidate it as an unlawful regulation
of commerce by imputing a wrong motive.
Thereupon Congress passed a second Child Labor Law, in which
they invoked the broader power to impose taxes, an almost unlimited power, and they imposed a prohibitive tax in the nature of
an excise tax upon any one who employed child labor. I argued
I confess
that ease in the Supreme Court for the Government.'
I argued it with a strong feeling that my contention ought not
to prevail, if our constitutional government was to continue.
Nevertheless, I felt that as able counsel would argue the invalidity
I14 Supra
note 12.
Supra note 11.
I Supra note 10.
I8 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1917).
" Hupra note 11.
18 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1921).
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of the law, it was due to Congress, especially as the decision of the
court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno 19 and McCray v. United States0
gave me ample warrant, to argue that the court had laid down the
doetrine and inasmuch as this was a clear exercise of the right to
impose a tax, that the purpose of that tax, whether it was for
revenue or for some other purpose that was within the competence
of the States, was not for the court to determine, but was for the
decision of Congress. I lost the case, but approve the decision.
If child labor is a matter that should be regulated by the Federal
Government, then the only orderly and decent way is to put a constitutional amendment in the Constitution, but not to usurp power; because there is no cause, no matter how great it may be,
no matter how great its appeal to human sympathy, that justifies
a violation of the Constitution of the United States.
There the doctrine rests, not wholly in a satisfactory form, because the court there said that from the text of the statute it could
determine that its purpose was not to raise revenue, but to regulate child labor.
There seems to be an inconsistency in the application of this
doctrine by the court when it is a State statute under consideration and when it is a Federal statute. When it is a Federal
statute, if the Congress conceals its purpose in its text, then in
the language of the present doctrine of the court, no matter how
satisfied the court may be that the ulterior purpose is to usurp
a right of the States, the Supreme Court may not question the
perversion of a delegated power.
But when it comes to a State statute the Supreme Court does
not apply any such rigid rule. On the contrary, remembering its
high function to preserve the paramount authority of the Federal
Government within its sphere, it says: "We do not care what
the form of the statute is, we do not care what it says, we
simply look at its inevitable purpose or effect, the history of tie
legislation, and we take into account our knowledge as intelligent
men, and we know that that statute was passed to accomplish a
purpose that is subversive of our form of government and therefore we declare it invalid, no matter how specious the language of
the statute may be."
If that is a good principle for a State statute, is it not good for
a Federal statute? It is just as much the concern of the Supreme
Court to nullify 'an unconstitutional Federal statute as a State
SSupra note 10.

Supra note 11.
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statute; and yet the doctrine is applied with rigidity as to a Federal statute, but with comparative elasticity as to a State statute.
As to State stautes, let me quote a few expressions of the
Supreme Court to show how jealous they are of any invasion of
the Federal power. In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 21 Mr.
Justice Miller said:
"In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose
must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect."
In Morgan v. Louisiana,22 the same Justice said:
"In all cases of this kind it has been repeatedly held that
when the question is raised whether a State statute is a just
exercise of State power or is intended by roundabout means to
invade the domain of Federal authority this court will look into
the operation and effect of the statute to discern its purpose."
In Mugler v. Kansas,23 Justice Harlan said:
"The courts are not bound by mere forms nor are they to
be misled by mere pretences. They are at Liberty, indeed are
under a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon an inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority."
The last case is Smith v. St. Louis Ry. Company. 2' In it Mr.
Justice McKenna said:
"Any pretence and masquerade will be disregarded and the
true purpose of the statute determined."
I speak with a great deal of emphasis on this subject, because
this nullification by indirection, this perversion of delegated powers, is in my judgment a greater menace to the Constitution than
any other, of which I have any knowledge. I am not suggesting
that the court could make an inquiry as to what individual members of Congress thought or said when they voted for the law.
My contention is that if Congress passed a law, even though it
be in the exercise of a delegated power, even though it be the
almost unrestricted power to tax, yet, if the Supreme Court, having
knowledge of the history of the law, taking into consideration its
inevitable effect is clearly satisfied that its purpose is not a fiscal
purpose, but is to invade and usurp some right reserved to the
States, then it is its solemn duty so to declare, no matter how
specious the language of the statute may be, just as they would do
if it were a State statute.
One further matter remains for discussion. The court at present is a very overworked court. Let me contrast it with the old
- 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543 (1875).
= 118 U. S. 455, 30 L. Ed. 237 (1885).
123 U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887).
- 181 U. S. 248, 45 L. Ed. 847 (1900).
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days. Prior to 1825 the court disposed of 24 cases a year. From
1826 to 1830 it disposed of 58 cases. From 1846 to 1850 the annual average was 71 cases. In October, 1891, there were 1,582
cases on the docket, and it took three years for a litigant to have
a hearing. That was relieved by the creation of the Circuit Court
of Appeals. But today the court at each session has about 1,000
cases upon the calendar. Speaking approximately, about one-third
of the cases are never reached, and go over to the next term.
About one-third are cases of application for certiorari, that is to
say, for leave to appeal, and they are not so difficult to dispose of.
About one-third of the thousand cases are difficult, complicated
cases, covering the whole field of the law, and a large percentage
of them involving constitutional questions of the very greatest
importance. The court is asked to decide that number of cases
as best they can between October and June. The thought that
deeply impresses me is that it has not time adequately to discharge
its duties. It has a choice of evils. If, on the one hand, it allows
ample time for argument, there would be inordinate delay in
litigation. If, on the other hand, it restricts the time, as it does,
to one hour a side, in many cases there is a partial denial of justice.
I know quite well that some of the Justices of the Supreme
Court think one hour is ample-in fact, one of them is in favor
of the Pennsylvania rule, that counsel have only a half hour. In
my judgment, there are many cases which cannot be adequately
submitted on briefs nor adequately discussed in one hour or two
hours, or even longer. I know it is said that a lawyer, who
cannot make his point within one hour is not fit for his work, but
that it a generality and it is not borne out by the facts of many
cases. Of course, you can indicate the general purport of a contention, but when it comes to any such meticulous discussion as
prevails in the English courts, such a limitation of time makes it
impossible adequately to discuss a case.
I argued a case a couple of years ago in the Privy Council, the
Supreme Court of the British Empire. We were given unlimited
time. We took five days. My colleague, who opened the case,
read substantially all of the important testimony to the court.
Every case that was cited, and not many were cited, was not only
discussed at the bar of the court, but the justices had the volumes
of the reports in their hands when it was discussed. For five
days across the table, in what was a very delightful conversation,
that subject was discussed, and when that case was submitted,
there was not a nook or cranny of the case that the court did not
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know on the facts; and as for the law there was not a pertinent
case that it had not considered with great deliberation.
I am not contending for five-day arguments. I think I never
made but one argument that lasted more than two hours. That was
the Northern Securities Case,25 which I argued in St. Louis and
in which I spoke for four hours. That is the head and front of my
offending in that regard. Even in the Privy Council case, while
my opponent took two and one-half days and my colleague took
two days, I took only two hours.
But I do not believe in express train methods of decision in
the Supreme Court of the United States. Its golden days were
in the old days of calm and leisurely deliberation. The great
pioneer cases, whose decisions are the classics of our constitutional
jurisprudence, took nine, ten, and eleven days. They were days
when the members of the bar were restricted in number, constituted a galaxy of talent such as never existed before and, in the
nature of the case, can never exist again-Pinkney, Webster,
Henry Clay, Emmet, Oakley, Luther Martin, Alexander Hamilton.
Webster argued for forty years in the Supreme Court. Pinckney
was in one-half of all the cases in one volume of the Supreme
Court reports, and these men were great gladiators. The whole
country looked with profound interest to the discussions in the
Supreme Court of the United States, when the very foundations
of our Government were being laid in that august tribunal.
All that has vanished today. A little group of tourists will
come into the court and sit there for a few moments and walk out.
Otherwise, little public interest is taken in the court by the outside public. The express train method of an hour a side means
that counsel hurry through their cases without any grace of expression or without any particular elaboration, stating very briefly
what they understand to be the facts and very simply their contention of the law; and quickly the court passes to another case.
The court having not merely the judicial function in private
litigation, but a super-judicial and quasi-legislative function,the function of a constitutional convention in the matter of building up the superstructure of our Government-should not be compelled to have such rapid fire methods of argument. I can only
recall two cases that time was given as in the old days. One was
the Prohibition Cases;2" the other was the Insular Cases,27
each of which had a week. But for the most part questions of the
- 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. Ed. 679 (1903).
253 U. S. 350, 64 L. Ed. 946 (1919).
= 182 U. S.
(1900).
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most profound importance, questions that will affect America for
generations to come, are discussed in an hour and a half. Do you
think that Gibbons v. Ogden,2" McCulloch v. Maryland,29 or Marbury v. Madison,30 or any of those great decisions, would have
been written with the meticulous care that has made them the admiration of successive generations if they had not been argued at
the bar of the court with painful deliberation and with all the
wealth of scholarship that men like Webster, Wirt, Pinckney,
Choate and Binney could command.
The only remedy is to restrict again the jurisdiction of the
court. To that the court is not averse. The court is asking for
it. The hardworking Chief Justice of the United States has offered
a good plan to lessen the floodtide of litigation, much of which is
too unimportant for the august tribunal
I believe that as long as the quantitative standard prevails in
the Supreme Court, as of necessity it must with the attempt to dispose of so many cases, as against the qualitative standard, which
prevailed in the earlier days of the Republic, that court will not
maintain its great prestige in our system of government.
Therefore the Court should not fritter away its great energies
in petty private litigation which interests only John Jones and
Thomas Smith, but has no continuing influence upon the future of
America.
My, suggestion, as far as I have roughly thought it out, would
be this:
I believe that the Supreme Court should be restricted in its
jurisdiction to the following cases:
First, whenever the United States is a party to the litigation
and the Attorney General of the United States certifies that in his
judgment it is of public importance that the United States should
have the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, a
writ of error or appeal ought to be as of right. You may suggest
the Attorney General would abuse that right. If he abuses it, he
would be very promptly admonished by the court. But I take it
that the United States Government, because of this co-operation of
which I have spoken in the earlier parts of my address, ought to
have the right to go into that court in any case in which it is a
,litigant. But its right ought to be confined to cases where the
Attorney General himself, on his personal responsibility certifies
= 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
20 Supra note 3.

1' Supra note 1.
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that it is a case that justifies a place on a much narrower calendar
than has previously existed.
All other appeals ought to be by application for leave to appeal,
just as applications for leave to appeal are made to the Privy
Council, and wherever the Justices found in such an application
a jurisdictional question the court should grant that appeal.
Second, wherever upon a like application in private litigation it
appears that there is in substance and fact and not by the ingenuity of counsel a susbtantial constitutional question, it should
be obligatory upon the Supreme Court, if satisfied as to the substantial character of the constitutional question, to allow the
appeal.
As to all other cases, now appealable, there should be a right to
apply to the court as of grace for a certiorari to determine whether
the question is of general importance.
If you could thus restrict the litigation of the Supreme Court
to cases that the Attorney General would certify that the Government as a litigant had such an interest that that court ought to
hear it, and to private cases where a substantial jurisdictional
question, or where a substantial constitutional question is involved,
you would cut down the calendar of the Supreme Court at least
one-half and probably two-thirds, and even then they would have
more cases than they had in the earlier days of the Republic. That
court is as able a court today as it ever was.
By reducing the calendar to a limited number of cases and
leaving all others to go to the Circuit Court of Appeals, it is
possible the golden days of the court would return. A member
of the bar, given a subject for discussion and a reasonable time to
make as good an argument as he could, would approximate the
arguments of the old days of the court, and it would then become
again, as it was once, the greatest forum of intellectual debate in
the world.
Let me say in conclusion that if anything that I have said seems
to be wanting in respect for the great court of which I have spoken,
for which I have so profound a respect, do not regard it so. I
decline to attribute to the Supreme Court a judicial infallibility
that a good Catholic imputes to the Holy Father in matters of
doctrine. It is a very human institution in our governmental
system. It is, in my judgment, the noblest court that the world'
has ever known. I know of none other so free from flaws. I
know of no sun so resplendent and with so few spots.
May I conclude by quoting the concluding paragraph in the
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chapter on the Supreme Court of my recent book "The Constitition of the United States:"
"The American republic has attempted for over one hundred
and thirty years and on a scale unprecedently vast to solve the
great problem of government by the people. It has been a period
of fierce controversy and bitter party strife. Like the ocean,
the political life of the American republic is at times placid, with
hardly a ripple upon its surface, and then the furious storms of
discontent lash the waters into violent and angry seas. But always the Supreme Court stands as a great lighthouse, and even
when the waves beat upon it with terrific violence (as in the
Civil War, when it was shaken to its very foundation), yet after
they have spent their fury, the great lamp of the Constitutionas that of another Pharos--illumines the troubled surface of the
waters with the benignant rays of those immutable principles
of liberty and justice, which alone can make a nation free as well
as strong."
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